Tom Douglas is Director of Research and Development and Senior Research Fellow in the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics. He is also Principal Investigator on the Wellcome Trust-funded project 'Neurointerventions in Crime Prevention: An Ethical Analysis' and Lead Researcher in the Oxford Martin Programme on Collective Responsibility for Infectious Disease. He initially qualified as a medical doctor at the University of Otago (New Zealand) before taking up a Rhodes Scholarship in Oxford, where he received his BA in Philosophy, Politics & Economics in 2005, and his DPhil in Philosophy in 2010. From 2010-2013 he was a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow in the Uehiro Centre and a Junior Research Fellow at Balliol College. Tom’s research lies mainly in practical and normative ethics. In practical ethics, his work focuses on the ethics of using medical technologies for 'non-medical' purposes, such as crime prevention and behaviour change. In normative ethics he is primarily interested in the nature of moral improvement and in tensions between special obligations and requirements of fairness. Previously, he has written on slippery slope arguments, organ donation policy, the philosophical foundations of injury compensation law, and the dual-use dilemma.
We seek to develop a plausible conception of genetic parenthood, taking a recent discussion by Heidi Mertes as our point of departure. Mertes considers two conceptions of genetic parenthood-one invoking genetic resemblance and the other genetic inheritance-and presents counter-examples to both conceptions. We revise Mertes' second conception so as to avoid these and related counter-examples.
Neural and environmental modulation of motivation: What’s the moral difference?
DOUGLAS, T, BIRKS, D
Treatment for Crime: Philosophical Essays on Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice
Stem Cell-Derived Gametes, Iterated In Vitro Reproduction, and Genetic Parenthood
Douglas, TM, Devolder, K
The Uehiro Foundation's 30th Anniversary Publication
Robert Sparrow has recently raised the possibility that stem cell technology could in the future be used to create multiple generations of embryos in the laboratory before transferring one embryo to a woman’s womb to create a pregnancy. Sparrow argues that any children produced in this way would be genetic orphans—they would lack living genetic parents—and explores the possible moral implications of this. A number of other authors have raised objections to Sparrow’s moral claims, but his descriptive claim remains unchallenged. In this chapter, we challenge it, arguing that Sparrow’s imagined technology could be performed in such a way that the children produced would have living genetic parents.