Do Groups Have Well-Being?: Objections from Hedonism and the Consciousness Requirement
Abstract: Do groups have well-being? I investigate this underexplored question and offer a partial defense of group well-being. After setting out the importance of the question, I present a positive argument for group well-being. I argue that many plausible theories of well-being establish group well-being. I then turn to two serious, but not insurmountable, objections. One is that my argument above cuts in both ways: if it turns out that a certain type of well-being theory is true, it rather shows that no groups have well-being. The second objection comes from a widely accepted view that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for being a welfare subject. For the first objection, I argue that there are important differences between my positive argument and the objection: these asymmetries render the objection implausible while keeping my argument intact. For the second objection, I argue that we should weaken the consciousness requirement because the original requirement is undermotivated and faces a counterexample. I appeal to the metaphysical view called perdurantism in the course of this discussion.
Speaker: Rei Takahashi (Oxford Uehiro/St Cross Scholar)
A hybrid event for Uehiro Centre Members and Associates (booking not required).
