Virtue signalling is virtuous
Professor Neil Levy: List of publications
Belie the belief? Prompts and default states
The Surprising Truth About Disagreement
No-Platforming and Higher-Order Evidence, or Anti-Anti-No-Platforming
Applying Brown and Savulescu: the diachronic condition as excuse.
Putting the luck back into moral luck.
Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not)
Taking Responsibility for Responsibility.
Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons.
Knowledge From Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology.
Due deference to denialism: explaining ordinary people's rejection of established scientific findings.
Nudges to reason: not guilty.
In praise of outsourcing
Responsibility as an Obstacle to Good Policy: The Case of Lifestyle Related Disease.
What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?
You meta believe it
Taking responsibility for health in an epistemically polluted environment.
Obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disorder of attention.
Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too.
Believing in compatibilism
Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser
Nudges in a post-truth world.
Religious beliefs are factual beliefs: Content does not correlate with context sensitivity.
Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data.
Strong-willed but not successful: The importance of strategies in recovery from addiction
Am I A Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism
Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck
Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements
The regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: refining Maslen et al.'s model.
Do-it-yourself brain stimulation: a regulatory model.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADDICTIVE DISORDERS
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ADDICTIVE DISORDERS
Defending the Consciousness Thesis A Response to Robichaud, SriPada, and Caruso
Are You Morally Modified?: The Moral Effects of Widely Used Pharmaceuticals.
Addiction as a disorder of belief
Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it.
Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgment (vol 92, pg 323, 2013)
The regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: extending the medical model.
Corrigendum to 'Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement' [Biol. Psychol., 92, (2013), 323-328] doi:10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.09.005
Disease, Normality, and Current Pharmacological Moral Modification
Regulation of devices for cognitive enhancement.
Beta adrenergic blockade reduces utilitarian judgement.
Strength in cognitive self-regulation.
The role of task-related learned representations in explaining asymmetries in task switching.
A role for consciousness after all
The neuroethics of non-invasive brain stimulation.
Moore on Twin Earth
Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on “Neuroethics: A New Way of Doing Ethics”
Resisting ‘Weakness of the Will’
Introduction: Appiah's experiments in ethics
Scientists and the folk have the same concepts
What, and where, luck is: A response to Jennifer Lackey
Culpable Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Reply to FitzPatrick
What difference does consciousness make?
LUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM.
Empirically informed moral theory: A sketch of the landscape
Moral significance of phenomenal consciousness.
Bad luck once again
Neuroethics and psychiatry.
Going beyond the evidence.
Does phenomenology overflow access?
Counterfactual intervention and agents' capacities
Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis.
Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories
Against sex selection.
Agents and Mechanisms: Fischer's Way
The social: a missing term in the debate over addiction and voluntary control.
Cognitive Scientific Challenges to Morality
On determinism and freedom
Autonomy and addiction
Epistemic Responsibility in the Face of a Pandemic