Professor Neil Levy specializes in empirical approaches to ethics and social issues. He has published widely on many topics in philosophy, ranging from philosophy of mind to bioethics. He has published more than 150 articles in refereed journals, and 7 books, including, most recently, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2014).
Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism
The Philosophical Quarterly
Belie the Belief? Prompts and Default States.
Religion, Brain and Behavior
Taking Responsibility for Health in an Epistemically Polluted Environment.
Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism and Consciousness
Davies, WH, levy, N
Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage
Hutchison, K, Mackenzie, C, Oshana, M
Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility
There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. In this chapter, Levy suggests that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. He argues that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. Levy concludes by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for
widespread ignorance about morally significant facts.