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  2. Professor Neil Levy

Professor Neil Levy

Levy, Neil
Research Fellow

Professor Neil Levy specializes in empirical approaches to ethics and social issues. He has published widely on many topics in philosophy, ranging from philosophy of mind to bioethics. He has published more than 150 articles in refereed journals, and 7 books, including, most recently, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Journal Articles

  • Applying Brown and Savulescu: the diachronic condition as excuse.

    Levy, N
    2019
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Journal of medical ethics

  • Putting the luck back into moral luck.

    LEVY, NEIL
    2019
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy

  • Are Free Will Believers Nicer People? (Four Studies Suggest Not)

    Crone, DL, Levy, NL
    2019
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    Journal article
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    Social Psychological and Personality Science
    © The Author(s) 2018. Free will is widely considered a foundational component of Western moral and legal codes, and yet current conceptions of free will are widely thought to fit uncomfortably with much research in psychology and neuroscience. Recent research investigating the consequences of laypeople’s free will beliefs (FWBs) for everyday moral behavior suggests that stronger FWBs are associated with various desirable moral characteristics (e.g., greater helpfulness, less dishonesty). These findings have sparked concern regarding the potential for moral degeneration throughout society as science promotes a view of human behavior that is widely perceived to undermine the notion of free will. We report four studies (combined N = 921) originally concerned with possible mediators and/or moderators of the abovementioned associations. Unexpectedly, we found no association between FWBs and moral behavior. Our findings suggest that the FWB–moral behavior association (and accompanying concerns regarding decreases in FWBs causing moral degeneration) may be overstated.

  • Taking Responsibility for Responsibility.

    Levy, N
    2019
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Public health ethics
    Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts.

  • Nudge, Nudge, Wink, Wink: Nudging is Giving Reasons.

    LEVY, NEIL
    2019
    |
    Journal article
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    ERGO
    • More

Books and Chapters

  • Socializing responsibility

    Levy, N
    2018
    |
    Chapter
    |
    Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility

  • Divine Free Will

    Mawson, TJ
    Edited by:
    Timpe, K, Levy, N, Griffith, M
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    The Routledge Companion to Free Will

  • Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism and Consciousness

    Davies, WH, levy, N
    Edited by:
    sinnott-armstrong, W
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage

  • Naturalism and Free Will

    Levy, N
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism

  • Neuroscientific threats to free will

    Shepherd, JL
    Edited by:
    Timpe, K, Griffiths, M, Levy, N
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    Routledge Companion to Free Will
    • More
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