2. Professor Neil Levy

Professor Neil Levy

Levy, Neil
Research Fellow

Professor Neil Levy specializes in empirical approaches to ethics and social issues. He has published widely on many topics in philosophy, ranging from philosophy of mind to bioethics. He has published more than 150 articles in refereed journals, and 7 books, including, most recently, Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Journal Articles

  • Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism

    Levy, N
    Journal article
    |
    The Philosophical Quarterly

  • Belie the Belief? Prompts and Default States.

    Levy, N
    Journal article
    |
    Religion, Brain and Behavior

  • Taking Responsibility for Health in an Epistemically Polluted Environment.

    Levy, N
    Journal article
    |
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics.

  • What in the world is collective responsibility?

    Giubilini, A
    Journal article
    |
    Dialectica

  • Showing our seams: A reply to Eric Funkhouser

    Levy, N
    2018
    |
    Journal article
    |
    Philosophical Psychology
    © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group In a recent paper published in this journal, Eric Funkhouser argues that some of our beliefs have the primary function of signaling to others, rather than allowing us to navigate the world. Funkhouser’s case is persuasive. However, his account of beliefs as signals is underinclusive, omitting both beliefs that are signals to the self and less than full-fledged beliefs as signals. The latter set of beliefs, moreover, has a better claim to being considered as constituting a psychological kind in its own right than the set of beliefs Funkhouser identifies.
    • More

Books and Chapters

  • Divine Free Will

    Mawson, TJ
    Edited by:
    Timpe, K, Levy, N, Griffith, M
    Chapter
    |
    The Routledge Companion to Free Will

  • Persistent Vegetative State, Akinetic Mutism and Consciousness

    Davies, WH, levy, N
    Edited by:
    sinnott-armstrong, W
    Chapter
    |
    Finding Consciousness: The Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law of Severe Brain Damage

  • Socializing Responsibility

    Levy, N
    Edited by:
    Hutchison, K, Mackenzie, C, Oshana, M
    2018
    |
    Chapter
    |
    Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility
    There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. In this chapter, Levy suggests that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. He argues that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. Levy concludes by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts.

  • Naturalism and Free Will

    Levy, N
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism
    © 2016 John wiley & sons, inc. All rights reserved. Most of the philosophers engaged in the free will debate accept some kind of naturalism constraint. In this chapter, I distinguish three different kinds of naturalism. Strong naturalists hold that philosophical theorizing should be actually guided by current science, whereas weak naturalists avoid postulating any entities or processes that conflict with science (but may take bets on how science will evolve). Mid-strength naturalism is agnostic about how future science will evolve, but is not actually guided by the science. I argue that though compatibilism tends to fare better on this scale when we consider its relationship to physics, consideration of neuroscience and psychology complicates the picture: major compatibilists engage in as much speculation and scientifically unmotivated postulation of entities and processes as major libertarians. I end by asking whether philosophers engaged in this debate ought to accept that the stronger a view's naturalist credentials, the better warranted it is.

  • Neuroscientific threats to free will

    Shepherd, JL
    Edited by:
    Timpe, K, Griffiths, M, Levy, N
    2016
    |
    Chapter
    |
    Routledge Companion to Free Will
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