Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of certain evaluative beliefs to undermines their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I show that EDAs are merely instances of a familiar form of argument commonly used in both evaluative and non-evaluative contexts. It’s often overlooked, however, that EDAs presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with the parallel and more sweeping metaethical argument recently put forward by Joyce and Street. After examining several ways of responding to this global evolutionary argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook.
