ONLINE ONLY
Abstract: Bernard Williams famously described the case of a ‘lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child’. The driver is without fault and, as many have argued, also not morally responsible because he could not possibly have foreseen the accident, was unable to prevent it when it happened, and did not display any other flaw in his conduct. In this presentation, I argue against these views and claim that, despite his lack of fault, the driver is genuinely morally responsible for the accident. I call this type of responsibility ‘strict moral answerability’, show how it has been neglected in the debates on responsibility, and argue that it could enrich debates in practical ethics, in particular on the so called ‘responsibility gap’ in the context of artificial intelligence.
This internal talk is for Oxford Uehiro Centre members and associates.
Zoom Meeting: Email rachel.gaminiratne@philosophy.ox.ac.uk to request the meeting link and passcode
