Abstract: Philosophers of biology and bioethicists have long tried to produce a satisfactory account of reproduction. Bioethicists have been interested in this project, partly, because such an account would answer the question of who reproduces when we employ new biotechnologies that have little to no resemblance to sexual reproduction, such as cloning or mitochondrial replacement techniques. Philosophers of biology, on the other hand, have been interested in such an account, partly, because it would enhance our understanding of biological individuality. In this paper I propose a new account of reproduction that I call the Overlap, Origination, and Development (OOD) account of reproduction. I do this after showing that the most promising accounts of reproduction are flawed because they are extensionally inadequate; they are either under inclusive or over inclusive. The OOD account is extensionally adequate, provides a principled solution to problematic cases, and is not radically revisionary in regards to the nature of reproduction.
Venue: Petrov Room, FHI, Suite 5 Littlegate House
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