Are free will believers nicer people?

Latest Open Access Paper

Crone, D., and Levy, N., (2019), 'Are free will believers nicer people? (Four studies suggest not)', Social Psychological and Personality Science, Vol: 10(5): 612–619 [PMC6542011]

One approach to defining enhancement is in the form of bodily or mental changes that tend to improve a person’s well-being. Such a “welfarist account”, however, seems to conflict with moral enhancement: consider an intervention that improves someone’s moral motives but which ultimately diminishes their well-being. According to the welfarist account, this would not be an instance of enhancement—in fact, as I argue, it would count as a disability. This seems to pose a serious limitation for the account. Here, I elaborate on this limitation and argue that, despite it, there is a crucial role for such a welfarist account to play in our practical deliberations about moral enhancement. I do this by exploring four scenarios where a person’s motives are improved at the cost of their well-being. A framework emerges from these scenarios which can clarify disagreements about moral enhancement and help sharpen arguments for and against it.  [continue reading...]

Grant: 'Responsibility and Healthcare' | Wellcome Trust 104848/Z/14/Z | PI: Professor Julian Savulescu | Open Access papers linked to this grant on EuropePMC

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